Forecaster has to predict, sequentially, a string of uncertain quantities (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :), whose values are determined and revealed, one by one, by Nature. Various criteria may be proposed to assess Forecaster's empirical performance. The Weak Prequential Principle requires that such a criterion should depend on the forecaster's behaviour or strategy only through the actual forecasts issued. A wide variety of appealling criteria is shown to respect this Principle. We further show that many such criteria also obey the Strong Prequential Principle, which requires that, when both Nature and Forecaster make their choices in accordance with a common joint distribution P for (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :), certain stochastic properties, underlying and justifying the criterion and inferences based on it, hold regardless of the detailed speci cation of P.
In order to understand further this compliant behaviour, we introduce the prequential framework, a game-theoretic basis for Probability Theory in which it is impossible to violate the Prequential Principles, and we describe its connexions with classical Probability Theory. In this framework, in order to show that some criterion for assessing
INTRODUCTION
The prequential approach to Statistics (Dawid, 1984 (Dawid, , 1991 (Dawid, , 1992a (Dawid, , 1992b ) is based on the idea that we can judge the quality of an inference method by converting it into a forecasting system, and assessing the empirical success of the sequence of one-step-ahead forecasts that it implies. In this context, it is natural to impose what we here term the`Weak Prequential Principle', which requires that any criterion for assessing the empirical validity of some Forecaster should depend only on the actual one-step-ahead forecasts he issues, and the speci c outcomes chosen by Nature, and not otherwise on Forecaster's strategy. We are particularly concerned with forecasts which have an interpretation in terms of a (perhaps partially speci ed) probability distribution, expressing Forecaster's uncertainty about the next observable. Then Forecaster might be thought of as having issued his forecasts in accordance with some overall joint distribution P for all the observables (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :).
The Weak Prequential Principle then asserts the irrelevance of any aspect of P, beyond the sequence of probability forecasts actually made (which are obtained by conditioning on the actually realized past outcome values).
When we come to apply such a validity criterion, we typically want to examine stochastic measures, such as signi cance levels, which will generally depend on the full speci cation of P. However, if all we have observed is the string of forecasts issued by Forecaster, and the outcomes determined by Nature, we will not be in a position fully to determine P. The`Strong Prequential Principle' requires that the dependence of the stochastic properties of the criterion on P should vanish, at least asymptotically; when this applies, it licenses stochastic conclusions on the basis of the realised value of the validity criterion, even in the absence of full knowledge of P. In particular, meaningful stochastic inferences may then be made, given only the observed sequences of forecasts and outcomes, and no further information about P. It is a remarkable fact that many useful inferences do in fact have this strong property.
In this paper we rst illustrate the above considerations for a variety of appealling criteria, and then, in an attempt to understand this behaviour, introduce a new game-theoretic framework for Probability Theory, the`prequential framework', which is particularly suited for the study of such problems.
Section 2 introduces a variety of forecasting tasks, involving binary or uniformly bounded continuous variables. In x3 we consider several validity criteria, with various probabilistic motivations, which respect the Weak Prequential Principle, while in x4 we demonstrate that these all respect the Strong Prequential Principle also. Section 6 introduces the idea of a prequential game, which involves three players: Forecaster, Nature and Statistician.
No underlying probabilistic model is required for this. In x7 the prequential framework is used to give de nitions of, rst,`full' (`almost certain') events, and then`prequential probability'. It is shown how results justifying the use of our performance criteria may be derived in this framework, with proofs often parallelling standard proofs of well-known probabilistic theorems. . . except that now it is not necessary to assume even the existence of an underlying probability distribution. However, once the prequential result is obtained, the standard probabilistic result then follows; and, because of its prequential provenance, must hold irrespective of the assumed underlying probability distribution. This then provides the desired explanation of the good behaviour of the criteria considered. Two appendices provide sample proofs of required results within the prequential framework; speci cally, they are related to the proofs of the strong law of large numbers and the law of the iterated logarithm.
FORECASTING TASKS
Every forecasting task involves at least two participants, Nature and Forecaster. Successively, for i = 1; 2; : : :, Nature determines a value x i for some uncertain quantity X i . In this paper we shall only consider the simplest cases where X i take values in: a two-element set (the binary case); we shall always take this set to be f0;1g; a closed interval of the real line IR; we shall always take it to be ?1;1]. Typical examples are: X i = 1 if the ith day is rainy and X i = 0 if not (the rst case); X i is the maximum temperature on the ith day (the second case;
to t the temperature into the interval ?1;1] we can take, say, 1000 C as our unit of measurement). Just before X i is disclosed by Nature, Forecaster issues a forecast F i for X i . This can be a probability forecast, or something weaker, as the following examples demonstrate.
Examples
Probability forecasting of binary outcomes. X i takes values in f0;1g; the allowed forecasts are F i = P i 2 0; 1] (interpreted as the probability that X i = 1).
Mean-value forecasting of continuous outcomes. Con dence-interval forecasting of continuous outcomes. X i takes values in ?1;1]; the allowed forecasts are pairs F i = (L i ; U i ) such that ?1 L i U i 1, with the following interpretation: just before X i is disclosed, the odds are at least 99 to 1 that X i 2 L i ; U i ].
Probability forecasting of continuous outcomes. X i takes values in ?1;1]; the allowed forecasts F i are arbitrary probability distributions P i on ?1;1], with P i (E), E ?1;1], interpreted as the forecast probability that X i 2 E. A slight variation of this forecasting task is where Forecaster is required to issue only continuous forecasts P i (i.e., such that P i (fxg) = 0 for any point x 2 ?1;1]).
WEAK PREQUENTIAL PRINCIPLE
We wish to consider how good Forecaster is at forecasting Nature's outcomes. In some cases, each of Forecaster and Nature may use deterministic or stochastic strategies for deciding their moves (forecasts and outcomes, respectively). In others, these moves may be regarded as simply produced when required, with no underlying strategy (an example of this might be a weather forecaster's sequence of daily probabilities of precipitation in the next 24 hours). Let f i be Forecaster's issued value of his forecast F i for X i , and x i the realised outcome of X i . (In general, we denote uncertain quantities by capital letters and the speci c values they take by the corresponding small letters.) The Weak Prequential Principle requires that any criterion for assessing the`agreement' between Forecaster and Nature should depend only on the actual observed sequences (f 1 ; f 2 ; : : :) and (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :), and not further on the strategies (if any) which might have produced these.
Violations
To clarify ideas, we start by exhibiting two criteria which do not respect the Weak Prequential Principle.
Marginal probabilities Suppose the X i are binary, and that Forecaster uses a forecasting strategy: this is a rule which determines his probability forecast for X i : F i = P i := P(X i = 1jX 1 ; : : :; X i?1 );
(1) for any i and any values of the previous outcomes (X 1 ; : : : ; X i?1 ). From all these conditional probabilities we can build up a full joint distribution P over the in nite sequence (X i ); and conversely, starting from any such distribution P, we can de ne a strategy for Forecaster by (1) (at any rate, for outcome sequences which are not assigned zero probability). Thus, we can regard Forecaster's strategy as equivalent to his using the joint distribution P to model Nature's outcomes. For this distribution, let i denote the marginal probability P(X i = 1).
Then we might impose, as our agreement criterion, the requirement that 1 n
as n ! 1.
In this case, Forecaster's actually issued one-step-ahead probability forecasts would be given by f i = p i := P(X i = 1jX 1 = x 1 ; : : :; X i?1 = x i?1 ); (3) where x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : are the actual outcomes chosen by Nature. It is clear that, given only the sequences (x i ) and (p i ), but not the underlying distribution P used to construct these forecasts, it is impossible to determine the marginal probabilities ( i ); and this can readily be con rmed by constructing di erent P, having di erent marginal probabilities ( i ), which yield identical forecasts (p i ) for some data-sequence (x i ). Consequently the criterion (2) does not depend only on the observed sequences (p i ) and (x i ), but further on the strategy P which Forecaster uses; it thus violates the Weak Prequential Principle.
Signi cance level Consider a problem of probability forecasting of (say) continuous outcomes, where again a strategy for Forecaster may be expressed in terms of his underlying joint probability model P for the (X i ). Let us take a test-statistic T, and assess the agreement between Forecaster and Nature by means of the observed signi cance level := P(T t); (4) t being the value of T for the speci c sequence (x i ). Again it is clear that, although quoting the value t of the test statistic (the \nominal inference": Dawid, 1983) would respect the Weak Prequential Principle, the associated signi cance level (the \stochastic inference") will typically depend further on P, and thus would not do so.
We shall nevertheless see later that, for suitable test-statistics, the dependence of on P may be asymptotically negligible. Both types of behaviour are exhibited in Example 1 below.
Our further examples will be formulated directly in terms of the sequences of forecasts and outcomes, so that they will automatically respect the Weak Prequential Principle.
Probability Forecasting of Binary Outcomes
Let f i = p i be the issued probability of the outcome 1 for the binary variable X i , and x i the realized value of X i .
Calibration We might require that
as n ! 1. This is the`simple calibration requirement', see Dawid (1982 Dawid ( , 1986 ).
An important generalisation of requirement (5) is that we might average, not over all i, but over some`predictable' sequence i k : if (i 1 ; i 2 ; : : :) is an increasing sequence of predictable nite stopping times, we can require that 1 n
as n ! 1. We might then regard the (p i ) as being poor probability assessments if (5), or (6) for a suitable subsequence or subsequences, were to fail. Dawid (1985) showed that two sequences of forecasts which both satisfy (6) for su ciently many subsequences must be asymptotically equivalent.
Central limit theorem Another criterion (see Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993) ) is motivated by the central limit theorem. Choose a large constant B > 0, and wait until the rst n such that
Then we could require that, for this n,
be`not large' as judged by the distribution N(0; 1). We could quote, as a measure of disagreement, the`observed signi cance level' obtained by referring (8) to N(0; 1), a small value counting against the validity of the issued forecasts. Once again, it is possible to apply such a criterion to predictable sequences i k , and further, in this case, to treat values calculated from disjoint subsequences as independent, thus allowing`omnibus' reference of a sum of squares of such values to a 2 distribution (Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993) ).
Law of the iterated logarithm Yet another criterion is related to the law of the iterated logarithm. We might require that:
In other words, we require (10) to hold so long as the denominator of its left-hand side tends to in nity, and we would thus reject the validity of the forecasts (p i ) if both (9) and (10) were to fail. Again, one could extend consideration to predictable subsequences.
Mean-Value Forecasting of Continuous Outcomes
Now let f i = m i be the issued mean-value forecast for the real quantity X i , with realized value x i . 
Strong law of large numbers
to N(0; 1).
Law of the iterated logarithm Require that
3. 
i (x i ; a i ) ) = 1: (19) 3.8 Cumulative Probability Integral Transform
Forecaster is now required to assess a probability distribution P i for real X i , having continuous cumulative distribution function. Let p i be the issued distribution. De ne u i = prob Y p i (Y x i ). Then we might assess (in various possible ways) the (u i ) for agreement with the hypothesis that they were obtained by random sampling from U 0; 1] (the uniform probability distribution in 0; 1]). For example, we could formally apply the Kolmogorov|Smirnov test for uniformity, or, as a test for independence, the uniform conditional test (Cox and Lewis, 1966) . A wide range of other tests could be similarly performed.
Farthingale
Fix a sequence of quantities S i = S i (P 1 ; X 1 ; : : : ; P i ; X i ); i = 0; 1; : : : ; (20) such that all S i 0, S 0 = 1, and, for all i 1, and xed P 1 , X 1 , P 2 , X 2 ,. . . , EY P i S i (P 1 ; X 1 ; : : :; P i?1 ; X i?1 ; P i ; Y ) = S i?1 (P 1 ; X 1 ; : : : ; P i?1 ; X i?1 ): (21) We shall call a sequence satisfying (21) a farthingale. It is similar to a martingale, except that the distribution used for taking the expectation in (21) is speci ed internally, rather than being constructed from an external global distribution for the (X i ). Dawid (1985, x13 .2) proposed, as an agreement criterion, the boundedness of all computable farthingales; Vovk (1993a) suggested a non-algorithmic approach similar to that of this paper. In xx 6 and 7 below we shall see how the idea underlying the farthingale can be made the cornerstone of a general approach to Probability.
PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOUR
Some motivation and justi cation for the criteria introduced in the previous section can be given, if we are willing to make the assumption that, for some`underlying' joint distribution P for (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :), Nature simulates her outcome values from P, and Forecaster uses the same,`true', distribution P to construct his forecasts. In such a case, we should surely regard Forecaster as doing as well as possible. Under such a model, various stochastic properties can be derived relating these`ideal' forecasts to observed outcomes. These describe how our criteria should behave in such ideal circumstances, and can thus be regarded as validating their use for assessing empirical performance in general. We assume the usual regularity conditions that ensure the existence of the relevant regular conditional probabilities.
Probability Forecasting of Binary Outcomes
If P is the underlying probability distribution, then the`ideal' probability forecast for the binary quantity X i is P i = EP (X i j X 1 ; : : : ; X i?1 ):
By the usual martingale strong law of large numbers (e.g., Stout (1974) , Theorem 3.3.1), with P-probability 1 (Dawid, 1982) . This is true no matter what P is, and can thus be regarded as a justi cation for insisting on the calibration criterion (5) as a necessary requirement for`valid' forecasts. Similarly, the stochastic analogue of (6) holds with P-probability 1, thus justifying its use.
The martingale central limit theorem in Billingsley (1986) (Theorem 35.9) implies that the random variable (24) where B is the smallest n satisfying n X i=1 P i (1 ? P i ) B; (25) should weakly converge to N(0; 1) as B ! 1, provided that
with P-probability 1.
Without invoking condition (26), which is not quite`prequential' (it depends on the behaviour of non-realized forecasts), we can still assert that, for any interval (a; b), (27) where ( ) is the standard normal distribution function; the interpretation of P B i=1 for B = 1 is obviously not essential to the meaning of (27). It is easy to see that (27) implies the weak convergence of (24) to N(0; 1) when (26) holds almost surely. These considerations then justify the use of criterion (8), judged against a standard normal reference distribution.
The law of the iterated logarithm for the case of binary outcomes asserts that, with P-probability 1, 
For justi cation of the criteria in x3.4, it again su ces to refer to the appropriate central limit theorem (Billingsley, 1986) , and its prequential variant analogous to (27); and to the general law of the iterated logarithm: with P-probability 1, either (28) or (29) holds (Stout, 1970) .
Con dence-Interval Forecasting of Continuous Outcomes
Let us assume that Forecaster uses some measurable strategy for selecting (L i ; U i ) as a function of the past outcomes X 1 ; : : :; X i?1 . We can interpret an ideal Forecaster's claim that the odds in favour of X i 2 L i ; U i ] are at least 99 : 1 as the following assertion about the underlying probability distribution P: P(X i 2 L i ; U i ] j X 1 ; : : : ; X i?1 ) 0:99; (33) for all i. The martingale analogue of Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers implies 4.5 Probability Forecasting of Continuous Outcomes Now each ideal forecast P i , i = 1; 2; : : :, is the conditional distribution (under P) of the random variable X i , given past outcomes: P i (E) = P(X i 2 E j X 1 ; : : :; X i?1 );
E ranging over the measurable subsets of ?1;1].
If now Z i , i = 1; 2; : : :, are arbitrary uniformly bounded measurable functions of (X 1 ; : : :; X i ), and M i = E (Z i jX 1 ; : : : ; X i?1 ), then we again have the strong law of large numbers:
with P-probability 1; similarly the appropriate central limit theorem and law of the iterated logarithm are again special cases of the classical results mentioned above.
Prequential Decision Theory
Recall that the ( i ) are uniformly bounded. For any predictable sequence (A i ) of actions ((A i ) being predictable may be interpreted as A i being chosen by some measurable strategy given X 1 ; : : :; X i?1 ),
is, under suitable measurability assumptions, a P-supermartingale with bounded increments, and so, with P-probability 1, Shiryayev (1984) , Corollary to Theorem VII.5.1). This justi es rejection of the issued probability forecasts (p i ) if another decision-maker, with the same information, can force (19). As a special case of the above, we can require A i = B i (Q i ), where Q i is the probability forecast for X i derived by a second forecaster, who calculates his forecasts as appropriate conditional probabilities based on some joint distribution Q. In this case we must have
Cumulative Probability Integral Transform
Suppose the conditional distributions P i are continuous, and de ne U i = U(P i ; X i ), where U(p; x) = prob Y p fY xg. Then, under P, the (U i ) are independent random variables distributed exactly as U 0; 1] (Rosenblatt, 1952) . This then justi es, as a criterion of empirical validity of the forecasts, the application to the (u i ) (where u i = U(p i ; x i ) is the realised value of U i ) of any suitable test for this independent uniform distributional model.
Farthingale
Assuming that all S i are measurable, (S i ) is a non-negative martingale under P, and so, for all c > 1,
(this is a special case of Doob's inequality; see, e.g., Shiryayev (1984)); this implies
Marginal probabilities
Finally let us consider the criterion (2), which does not respect the Weak Prequential Principle. General forms of the strong law of large numbers may be invoked to argue that, under some conditions on P, we should have, with P-probability 1,
as n ! 1. However, the generality of such a result is considerably less than in the cases considered above. For example, if under P the (X i ) are modelled as exchangeable, being independent Bernoulli trials with probability parameter , where is an unobserved quantity with a uniform distribution over 0; 1], then we have i 1 2 , but the P-almost sure limit of 1 n P n i=1 X i is the random variable , rather than the constant 1 2 as would be required by (41). This stands in contrast to property (23), which does still hold in this exchangeable case.
Strong Prequential Principle
It is noteworthy that each of the probabilistic properties listed in xx4.1{4.8, which may be regarded as providing`stochastic justi cation' for the corresponding criteria in x3, holds for all P. It is only required that the same joint distribution P should govern both Nature's (randomised) strategy for determining outcomes, and Forecaster's strategy for producing probability forecasts|a requirement that may be regarded as an expression of the \null hypothesis" that we do indeed have agreement between Forecaster and Nature. This robustness is surprising, since the relevant \stochastic inferences" are constructed using, in a fundamental way, the distribution P, and thus the strategies of the players; nevertheless, when those strategies agree, they can be essentially ignored. That is to say, the stochastic inferences considered above, while seemingly in violation of the Weak Prequential Principle (since they are de ned in terms of the strategies used, not just the sequences of outcomes), in fact turn out to be in accordance with that Principle (at least asymptotically). A stochastic inference with this robustness property, and its associated agreement criterion, will be said to respect the Strong Prequential Principle.
Collusion
Another way of expressing the Strong Prequential Principle is as follows. Suppose that Nature, instead of being oblivious to the choices made by Forecaster, in fact observes them, and reacts appropriately. Speci cally, if Forecaster has issued a probability forecast P i for X i , then Nature will produce x i by simulating from P i ; if Forecaster gives a mean-and variance forecast (M i ; D i ) for X i , Nature will simulate from some distribution with that mean and variance; etc. Any such strategy for Nature may be called collusive. (There is just one collusive strategy for probability forecasting, but typically many when the forecasts are less fully speci ed).
If Nature is colluding with Forecaster, She is endeavoring, in so far as possible, to bring about agreement between outcomes and forecasts. Hence the \null hypothesis", to be addressed by some proposed agreement criterion, may now be formulated as the assertion that Nature is being collusive; and a stochastic justi cation for the criterion should be based on performance under this hypothesis.
However, collusion does not of itself determine a full distribution for the (X i ), under which such performance could be assessed, since Forecaster is still free to choose his forecasts (F i ) as he desires. Suppose that he in fact does so by using some xed deterministic strategy for constructing F i in the light of previous outcomes and forecasts; and suppose Nature uses a collusive strategy. It is easy to see that this pair of strategies now determines Nature's joint distribution P for simulating (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :); and that Forecaster's forecasts are then consistent with P. Conversely, any common P, underlying both Nature's and Forecaster's choices, can be interpreted as arising this way. Consequently, the Strong Prequential Principle may be rephrased as requiring that, so long as Nature plays a collusive strategy, the desired stochastic inference will be probabilistically justi ed, no matter what Forecaster's strategy may be.
Super-Strong Prequential Principle
So far we have assumed that the only past information available, to both Nature and Forecaster, is the set of previous forecasts and outcomes. More generally, we could allow both players to have access to (the same) additional information: for example, temperature information when forecasting rain. This set-up can be formally expressed in terms of a ltered space ( ; F;(F i )), with the outcome sequence X i being adapted and the forecast sequence F i being predictable. We consider a probability distribution P dened on ( ; F). At every stage i Forecaster issues his forecast for X i in accordance with the relevant conditional distribution P( j F i?1 ) given all observed past information, and Nature simulates X i from the same distribution. All the results of xx 4.1{4.8 can be easily extended to this more general setting, with the proofs essentially unchanged.
We could further strengthen the Strong Prequential Principle to require validity of stochastic inferences in this more general setting (still requiring that Nature and Forecaster use the same, otherwise arbitrary, underlying distribution P; or, equivalently, that Forecaster use any P, while Nature op-erates a collusive strategy). This we shall term the Super-Strong Prequential Principle.
An application of the above general framework (wherein the data-base is extended to include the results of extraneous randomization) allows Forecaster to use a stochastic strategy, which, given past outcomes (x 1 ; : : :; x i?1 ) and forecasts (f 1 ; : : : ; f i?1 ), determines, not a xed forecast F i , but rather a distribution i for F i . After observing past outcomes and forecasts, Forecaster rst randomly generates F i from i , and then Nature, playing a collusive strategy, randomly generates X i in accordance with F i . The SuperStrong Prequential Principle requires validity of stochastic inferences in this randomized set-up.
Counter-example
We see from x4 above that all the criteria introduced in xx3.2{3.9 satisfy the Strong (indeed, the Super-Strong) Prequential Principle.
To clarify ideas, we now exhibit an example for which the Strong Prequential Principle is violated.
Example 1 Consider a special case of probability forecasting of continuous outcomes. For simplicity, we shall here relax the technical restriction that the values be con ned to ?1;1] or any other nite interval (similar examples could be constructed incorporating this restriction, or in other contexts we consider, such as probability forecasting of binary outcomes).
Let us consider as our agreement criterion the observed signi cance level (4), based on the statistic T X n for a xed n > 1. Although the actual value of the statistic only depends on the observed outcomes, and is thus in accord with the Weak Prequential Principle, the signi cance level explicitly involves the distribution P, i.e. the strategy used by Forecaster.
To verify that this does not respect the Strong Prequential Principle, consider two di erent strategies for Forecaster, corresponding to the following two joint distributions:
1. Under P 1 , the X i are modelled as following a stationary normal autoregressive model:
2. Under P 2 , the X i are modelled as independent, each having distribution N(2; 1), except for X 1 N(0; 4=3).
The marginal distribution of X n (n > 1) under P 1 is N(0; 4=3), while under P 2 it is N(2; 1).
Suppose that Nature produces data x i 4, all i. Then, for each i, both strategies P 1 and P 2 produce the identical sequence of probability forecasts: N(0; 4=3) for i = 1, N(2; 1) for i > 1. If the Strong Prequential Principle were satis ed, our assessment of agreement with the data would be the same for both P 1 and P 2 . However, using the criterion above, we nd = probfN(0; 1) > p 12g = 0:00027 for Case 1, while = probfN(0; 1) > 2g = :023 for Case 2. Since these di er, although the sequences of outcomes and forecasts do not, this criterion does not respect the Strong Prequential Principle. It is interesting to note that, had we used instead the statistic T P n i=1 X i , we would have obtained asymptotically identical observed significance levels in the two cases above|even though the null distributions of T are quite di erent. This can be veri ed directly. The reason is that, in each case, this statistic is essentially equivalent to that considered in (12), and the result then follows as in x4.3. This phenomenon extends to general stationary ARMA models.
2
Appendix A describes a range of plausible agreement criteria, all respecting the Weak Prequential Principle. Whereas some of them also respect the Strong Prequential Principle, still others do not.
These counter-examples notwithstanding, we have seen that, perhaps surprisingly, it is indeed possible to construct numerous appealling inferences and agreement criteria which do satisfy the Strong, as well as the Weak, Prequential Principle. The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to seek to understand more fully why this should be, and when.
PREQUENTIAL GAMES
The main reason why there are so many inferences satisfying the Strong Prequential Principle seems to be that these inferences can be expressed within the prequential framework, a new game-theoretic approach to Probability Theory which has the Weak and Strong Prequential Principles`built-in'. In Nature: Fig. 1 : Typical prequential game; the arrows indicate the order of moves of the three players the prequential framework, each forecasting task is represented as a perfectinformation game (with the goal of the game to be speci ed) involving, besides Nature and Forecaster, one more player, Statistician. Statistician plays against the combined forces of Forecaster and Nature. The rôle of Statistician will be to demonstrate that our inferences are valid. We shall discuss what this means in more detail in the next section. Here we describe the means that Statistician should have to accomplish his task.
We shall use the term`game' somewhat loosely, often to denote a partially speci ed game in which, for example, the rules of play are speci ed, but not the starting situation or the criterion for determining who has won. In describing our games, we shall often say that one player pays some amount to another player. We mean not money but in nitely divisible points. We let $n stand for`n points'.
A typical prequential game can be represented as in Figure 1 . In addition to the moves (F i ) of Forecaster and (X i ) of Nature, we have moves (H i ) for Statistician. The players, playing in the order indicated by the arrows, are allowed to see each other's past moves (the situation of complete information). The rules of an individual game will determine the allowable moves for each player. After each stage, when all three players have moved, Forecaster pays a certain amount, depending on those moves, to Statistician; again, the rules of a particular game will specify how this amount is to be calculated. Finally, we will need a rule for determining who has won the game (this may not be determined until an in nite number of stages of the game).
We now describe in more detail some speci c prequential games relevant for our purposes.
Probability Forecasting of Binary Outcomes
The simplest prequential game corresponds to X i binary. Forecaster's moves are F i = P i 2 0; 1]; Statistician's moves are H i 2 IR. The interpretation of the moves is as follows. Before X i is disclosed by Nature, Forecaster selects P i 2 0; 1], interpreted as his probability that X i = 1, or equivalently as his expectation (`fair price') for X i . We take this to mean (cf. de Finetti (1974), x3.3) that Forecaster allows Statistician to buy, before X i is disclosed, any number H i (possibly negative or non-integer) of tickets, each of which will pay $X i ; the price is $P i for a ticket.
De ne
K 0 being some given initial value. We interpret K 0 as Statistician's initial capital; then K i is Statistician's capital at stage i (we shall sometimes refer to K i as the capital process). Note that, given any xed strategy whereby
Statistician chooses H i as a function of previous moves, (K i ) will be a farthingale in the sense of (21).
We shall denote this game by G bin (K 0 (44) Intuitively, before Nature discloses X i , Forecaster o ers tickets which will pay $1 in case X i = 2 L i ; U i ] for the price of $0:01. The requirement H i 0 means that Forecaster does not assert that that the odds in favour of X i 2 L i ; U i ] are exactly 99:1, but that they are at least 99:1. Our notation for this game will be G 99% (K 0 ).
Probability Forecasting of Continuous Outcomes
The game G prob (K 0 ) is, like G mean (K 0 ), a generalisation of G bin (K 0 ). The difference from G bin (K 0 ) is that Nature's moves X i are now allowed to belong to the whole of ?1;1], Forecaster's moves F i = P i are probability distributions in ?1;1], Statistician's moves H i are Borel functions on ?1;1], and (42) is replaced by
(45) The interpretation is as follows. Forecaster's move P i means that he is willing to sell Statistician any of the following tickets: for any Borel function H: ?1;1] ! IR, the H-ticket obliges Forecaster to pay $H(X i ) to Statistician after X i is disclosed; and the price for the H-ticket is given by its mean value R H dP i with respect to the forecast distribution P i .
The variant of this game where the forecasts P i are required to be continuous distributions in ?1;1] will be denoted by G prob 0 (K 0 ); we need this variant to examine the cumulative probability integral transform.
For prequential decision theory we shall need one more player, Second Forecaster; just before X i is disclosed, Second Forecaster announces his forecast Q i (a probability distribution in ?1;1]) for X i . This game will be denoted by G prob+SF (K 0 ). When considering (37) instead of (38), we shall need a more powerful player, Decision Maker, who can directly choose actions A i rather than probability distributions Q i ; the corresponding game will be denoted by G prob+DM (K 0 ).
By forecasting task we shall mean a game with K 0 unspeci ed (so far we have used this notion informally); to denote a forecasting task we shall simply drop`(K 0 )' from our notation for the corresponding game.
PREQUENTIAL FRAMEWORK
Statistician is a mathematician whose rôle is to deduce various probabilistic consequences from Forecaster's assertions about the world. Thus he might wish to demonstrate that the calibration property (5) holds. But this can not be expected in complete generality; rather, only under the \null hypothesis" that Forecaster's forecasts provide a valid model of Nature's outcomes. In previous Sections this null hypothesis of agreement between Forecaster and Nature was interpreted in terms of the existence of a common (albeit unspeci ed) joint distribution P underlying both Nature's and Forecaster's strategies. Here we take a di erent approach. The tickets o ered to Statistician by Forecaster in the games described in the previous section are priced`fairly', from the point of view of Forecaster. If Forecaster's forecasts are \good" (in agreement with Nature), Statistician should not be able to make much money by betting at these fair prices. Conversely, if the forecasts are bad, Statistician should be able to pro t from their mismatch with Nature's outcomes. Thus, for any speci c realisation of the game, we can regard it as evidence for Forecaster having been wrong (i.e. out of agreement with Nature) when Statistician, starting from $1 (or any other positive capital), has managed greatly to increase his capital, without ever risking getting into debt (and the greater the increase in his capital, the more convincing the evidence).
Statistician could thus prove that the calibration property (5) holds, whenever Nature and Forecaster are in agreement, if he could ensure that, whatever Nature and Forecaster might do, either (5) will hold, or he will be able to demonstrate (by substantially increasing his capital) that Forecaster and Nature are not in agreement. If he can nd a strategy with this property, then he will have achieved his goal. This idea is the basis of the next de nition.
Full Events
Let G be any of the above forecasting tasks and let E be some substantive event, i.e., a property of the sequence of moves F 1 X 1 F 2 X 2 : : : of Forecaster and Nature alone. In our applications, the statement`(f 1 x 1 f 2 x 2 : : :) 2 E' will express some desirable property, such as (5) The disjunction in (b) corresponds to Statistician having demonstrated, either that Nature has colluded with Forecaster to bring about the occurence of E; or that there was a mismatch between forecasts and outcomes, which has allowed Statistician to amass an in nite fortune (while never going into debt). We are particularly interested in events E for which Statistician can force a win in game G E . Then, whenever E does not occur, we have evidence of non-collusion between Nature and Forecaster, with such a mismatch between forecasts and outcomes that Statistician makes an in nite fortune from a sequence of \fair bets". We can thus regard such an event E as a criterion of agreement between forecasts and outcomes. We shall say that event E is full (and its complement E c is null) in forecasting task G if Statistician has a winning strategy in game G E .
Our programme now is to show, for various interesting events E, that
Statistician has a winning strategy in G E (and even, wherever possible, to exhibit such a strategy); and thus demonstrate that E is full. We can then regard Forecaster as discredited if E fails to occur (so that Statistician, playing his winning strategy, makes an in nite amount of money).
The following Theorem asserts the existence of Statistician's winning strategies for many of the events considered above.
Theorem 1 (a) (cf. (31))
is full in forecasting task G mean .
(b) (cf. (28){ (29)) Event either For all the above assertions, proofs in our prequential framework can be closely modelled on already existing proofs of their probabilistic counterparts. Two sample proofs are given in the Appendices. Appendix B proves a prequential analogue of Doob's convergence theorem for non-negative martingales and brie y describes other ideas we need to deduce from it the`prequential strong law of large numbers', (a) above. Appendix C proves thè prequential law of the iterated logarithm' (upper half), (b) above; it is further shown how the proof given there also implies (c) and (a). The proofs are, in essence, simple modi cations of well-established martingale-based proofs.
It is important that we can explicitly construct winning strategies for Statistician which satisfy many desiderata: are measurable, computable, etc. (in the case of items (d) and (e), provided that the loss functions and the functions S i satisfy these desiderata).
Item (a) of Theorem 1 implies that event (36) is full in forecasting task G prob (in some sense game G prob (1) is easier for Statistician to play than G mean (1): in G prob (1), Forecaster is required to give more speci c forecasts).
Analogously, item (d) implies that event (38) is full in the forecasting task G prob+SF . It is also clear that the events (23) and`(28) or (29)' (with M i = P i , D i = P i (1 ? P i )) are full in G bin .
7.1.1 Connexion with the Conventional Notion of Almost Sure Event Let E be any full event. Fix any joint distribution P for (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :). Let Forecaster use either the strategy that calculates its forecasts from P (see (22), (30), (32), and (35)) or a measurable strategy that`agrees' with P (as in (33)), and let Nature use the collusive randomised strategy in which X i is simulated from the distribution function F i (t) = P(X i t j X 1 = x 1 ; : : : ; X i?1 = x i?1 ). Then (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :) is simulated from P. Consider the behaviour of Statistician's capital process (K i ) (with K 0 = 1) under his measurable winning strategy. Since every non-negative supermartingale is bounded with probability 1 (we already used a similar fact in x 4.8) and (K i ) is now a non-negative P-supermartingale (even a P-martingale in all cases except (33)), the event \K i ! 1" has P-probability 0; therefore, by (b) of the requirement for a full event, E occurs with P-probability 1. This argument holds for any P.
To see now that each of the agreement criteria mentioned in Theorem 1 must satisfy the Strong Prequential Principle (as already con rmed directly in x4), it is enough to combine the above argument with the results of Theorem 1. In fact, an essentially identical argument demonstrates that the Super-Strong Prequential Principle will also be satis ed in such cases, thus allowing Forecaster to take into account additional information, beyond the revealed history of the game.
Prequential Probability
The above development has allowed us to introduce a game-theoretic analogue of the concept of an event's having probability 0 or 1. We now extend this framework to allow measurement of non-extreme probabilities.
Up to now, Statistician was e ectively playing against Forecaster (with Nature as a neutral player), and Forecaster had in nite capital. Suppose now that Statistician starts with capital K 0 2 0; 1], and Forecaster with capital 1 ? K 0 . After i stages, Statistician's capital becomes K i . Either player loses when his capital becomes negative. Let E be some event. We wish to de ne what it means for E to be \reasonably certain" (unless the forecasts are bad).
Say that Statistician wins game G E (K 0 ) if (a) his capital K i reaches above 1 before reaching below 0, or (b) his capital K i is always in 0; 1], and E happens. If, for K 0 small, Statistician wins the game, then, if E has not occurred, we must be in situation (a); and then the large increase in Statistician's capital provides strong (though less that categorical) evidence for Forecaster having been wrong (out of agreement with Nature).
If Statistician has and uses a winning strategy for G E (K 0 ), then: (a) his capital can never be negative (at least if he stops as soon as it exceeds 1); and (b) whenever E fails, he will have made more than $1 out of $K 0 , thus casting doubt on the agreement between Forecaster and Nature. The smaller K 0 , the greater the doubt. Otherwise put, if E is an event for which Statistician can nd a winning strategy in G E (K 0 ) with K 0 small, then, whenever E fails, an outcome occurs (large increase in Statistician's capital) that is not very credible under the hypothesis that Forecaster's forecasts and Nature's outcomes are in agreement. Intuitively, the complement of E has \low probability", and thus E has \high probability", under this hypothesis; and the smaller we can make K 0 , the higher is \probability" of E. This motivates the following de nition. Let F(E) = f1 ? K 0 : Statistician can force a win in G E (K 0 )g be the range of Forecaster's initial capital for which Statistician has a winning strategy. Clearly,
We de ne the prequential probability of an event E to be PP(E) = sup F(E); with sup ; = 0. This notion generalises that of a full event: it can be shown that, for all our forecasting tasks, an event E is full if and only if PP(E) = 1 (provided that we allow Statistician to buy in nitely many tickets or, in the case of G prob , to buy tickets with potentially in nite payo , with natural conventions for operations with in nities).
We could generalise further and de ne`prequential expectation' (cf.
Vovk (1993b), x5). However, we shall not discuss this here. Now we can state the theorem corresponding to the remaining agreement criteria. Proof (Outline) The proof of the central limit theorem (a) for forecasting task G bin can be found in Vovk (1993a) , Theorem 5, which can be routinely extended to cover G mean&var . Once again, the proof is a simple modi cation of a standard proof (due to Lindeberg) from conventional probability theory. Proof of (c) is trivial. For both (a) and (c), the proofs involve explicit construction of winning strategies for Statistician.
In the case of item (b) our construction is also in some sense explicit.
Suppose we have 2 (0; 1) and a set E 0; 1] 1 such that U(E) > 1 ? .
Then there exists (see Vovk (1993a) PPfcpit(P 1 ; X 1 ; P 2 ; X 2 ; : : :) 2 Eg 1 ? : 2 Remark. In the terminology of Shafer (1996) and Vovk (1993b) , our`prequential probability' is`lower probability', and the`global probability' of Vovk (1993a) is`upper probability' (in our current framework, we can dene the upper probability of event E as 1 ? PP(E c )). Lower probabilities are analogous to Shafer's (1976) belief functions. Another language for introducing`prequential probability' is provided by Shafer's (1996) martingale trees.
Connexion with the Conventional Notion of Probability
For discussing connexions between prequential probability and the conventional notion of probability, it is convenient to change slightly the de nition of PP(E), adding the requirement that Statistician's winning strategy should be measurable. Theorem 2 continues to hold under this changed de nition of PP (in the case of items (b) and (c), provided E and S i are measurable). Consider a distribution P for (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :) and Forecaster's measurable strategy S that forms its forecasts in accordance with P. It is easy to see that PP(E ) P(E); (46) for any Borel set E, E standing for the event that (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :) 2 E and all P i are selected in accordance with S. Indeed, for any xed > 0 satisfying PP(E ) > 1 ? , let (K i ) be the capital process of Statistician's measurable winning strategy starting from $ . Then (K i ) is a non-negative P-supermartingale with K 0 = . So item (a) of the de nition of Statistician winning holds with P-probability at most (by Doob's inequality). Since event E is bound to happen when (a) fails, P(E) 1 ? . This observation shows that items (a){(c) of Theorem 2 imply their conventional counterparts given in x4.
Remark. We prefer not to impose the requirement of measurability on the players' strategies because: on the theoretical side, this requirement is likely to needlessly complicate more advanced parts of our theory; from the applied point of view, it is too weak: useful strategies must be at least computable.
(Of course, the assumption of measurability of strategies is very useful when discussing the relation of our approach to the conventional one.) On the other hand, measurable (in some sense) events E play a special role in our approach: Martin's (1975 Martin's ( , 1990 theorem asserts that the games G E and G E (K 0 ) are determined (in the sense that either Statistician or the team Forecaster&Nature has a winning strategy) when E is pseudo-Borel (which is the same as Borel when the players only can select their moves from a countable set).
DISCUSSION
Satisfaction of the Weak Prequential Principle is an appealling requirement to impose on an assessment criterion for agreement between forecasts and outcomes, since it focuses on the actual realised sequences, obviating the need to consider how these might have been produced. Of itself, however, it is clearly not su cient. For example, the trivial criterion which always asserts that Forecaster has been successful, or the equally vacuous criterion which always asserts that Forecaster has failed, are perfectly acceptable from the point of view of the Weak Prequential Principle alone. Some further justi cation for any proposed criterion is required. Such justi cation might be supplied by appealling to stochastic properties of the criterion, for example almost sure behaviour or an approximate signi cance level, which apply under the assumption that Forecaster is successful.
This last assumption can be formalised in various ways. In x4 we regarded it as asserting that Forecaster calculates his forecasts using the \true" distribution P from which Nature generates the outcomes. Since, however, we do not want the unknown true distribution to be relevant to the de nition of \success", we introduced the Strong Prequential Principle, requiring that dependence of the relevant stochastic properties on P be (exactly or asymptotically) absent. We saw that many appealling criteria respect both principles.
In x6 we described an alternative, completely prequential, game-theoretic framework, as the basis of a new approach to Probability. The Weak Prequential Principle is automatically satis ed: there is no way to use anything beyond the forecasts actually made by Forecaster (there is nothing more;
we make no assumptions on the way the forecasts are generated). In x7 we reinterpreted in this setting the assumption that Forecaster is \successful"; and showed how this could be used to explain why, in the more standard approach, many results turn out to be independent of the underlying distribution; thus validating a wide variety of assessment criteria as satisfying both Prequential Principles. It might be argued that our approach to Probability via prequential games is merely using another language to express already well-known results. There is some truth in this, but it is a language which is particularly well suited to bring out aspects which are often under-emphasised:
(a) The minimum speci cation of the problem necessary for the required results; (b) The universal applicability of the results, irrespective of the assumed underlying probability distribution.
Most important, the prequential results are available, and have essentially the same intuitive interpretation, even when we do not wish to assume the existence of an underlying distribution. For example, we can justify assessing a weather forecaster's probability of precipitation forecasts against the calibration criterion (5), in the knowledge that Statistician has a strategy such that, if (5) fails, he will be able to discredit Forecaster by making a fortune from him. This entirely non-probabilistic argument stands on its own merits.
Another technical point, not taken up here, is the possibility of re ning the idea of a`null event', and distinguishing between di erent categories of null event, in terms of the rate at which Statistician's fortune can grow when the event happens. This does not appear possible within the conventional approach. (Some work in this direction has been done within the algorithmic approach to probability theory: see, e.g., Loveland (1969) , Schnorr (1970 , 1971a , 1971b ), Vovk (1987 An interesting feature of the prequential framework is that it is based, not on measure theory, but on the theory of perfect-information games. In it, the usual task of proving something about averages is replaced by the task of constructing strategies which are guaranteed to achieve some goal. We hope that we have succeeded in convincing the reader that this approach is intuitive and fruitful, and that it could be valuable to develop a more general theory of prequential games such as those considered in x6 (in this paper we have not even given a fully general de nition of a prequential game).
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APPENDIX A: HILL'S CRITERIA In this Appendix we present an interesting family of agreement criteria introduced by Hill (1982) . We consider the probability forecasting game for continuous outcomes (with or without the restriction X i 2 ?1;1]). Let B be some subset of IR 1 . We denote by P(B) the set of all sequences (P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :) of probability forecasts such that the product distribution P 1 P 2 gives probability 1 to B. LetB denote the set of pairs (f; x) of sequences of moves by Forecaster and Nature respectively such that f 2 P(B) =) x 2 B; i.e. either x 2 B or f 6 2 P(B).
We might consider, as a possible agreement criterion between Forecaster and Nature, the requirement that (f; x) 2B. We may term this Hill's Bcriterion. Note that, by de nition, this will be satis ed with probability 1 whenever Nature generates Her outcomes from a product distribution, and Forecaster constructs his forecasts from the same distribution.
For any joint distribution P, consider the event B(P) := \f(P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :); (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :)g 2B";
where the outcomes X 1 , X 2 ,. . . and the forecasts P 1 , P 2 ,. . . are generated from P (see (35)). Then Hill's B-criterion will respect the Strong Prequential Principle if, for any probability distribution P over IR 1 , B(P) is P-almost certain. As remarked above, this is satis ed for all product measures P.
As shown in (Hill, 1982) , for a wide class of sets B Hill's B-criterion satis es the Strong Prequential Principle; namely, Hill shows that it is satis ed for f(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :) 2 IR 1 j x n 2 A n g; where A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : is a sequence of Borel sets in IR. Therefore, the following counter-example (Hill, 1982) is of interest.
Theorem 3 Proof De ne (+) to be the discrete uniform distribution over f0;1g, and (?) that over f?1;0g. Let X i = S i ?S i?1 , where the (S i ) are independently drawn from (+) . The distribution, M say, of the sequence (P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :) of onestep-ahead forecasts is such that the terms are independent, with P i = (+) or (?) , each with probability 1 2 . Our goal is to prove that event B(P) is not almost certain. Since clearly (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :) 2 B is always false, we are only required to prove that (P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :) 2 P(B) with positive probability. In fact, the following stronger property holds.
Lemma 1 Let (P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :) have joint distribution M. Then (P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :) 2 P(B) almost surely.
Proof Consider the following stochastic scenario: rst a sequence (P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :) is generated from M, and then a sequence of outcomes (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :) is generated from the product distribution P 1 P 2 in IR 1 . It is clear that X 1 , X 2 ,. . . are independent random variables taking values ?1;0;1 with probabilities 1 4 ; 1 2 ; 1 4 respectively. Therefore, by the usual law of the iterated logarithm (see (29) above), lim sup n!1 P n i=1 X i q n ln ln(n=2) = 1 almost surely, and so this equality holds almost surely under M-almost all product distributions P 1 P 2 .
2 2 APPENDIX B: DOOB'S CONVERGENCE THEOREM A proof of a prequential assertion can often be obtained by modifying some of the usually many proofs of its conventional counterpart. Examination of the proofs of the classical versions of the assertions in x4 shows that most of them rely on`martingale methods', and martingales are associated with games and gambling (Ville (1939) , Doob (1953) ; see also Stout (1974 ) or Shiryayev (1984 ). It is thus often possible to extract a`game-theoretic core' from such a proof, which is then seen to be a proof of some assertion about a perfect-information game, and thus directly relevant to the prequential result.
In this appendix we shall`translate' the usual proof of Doob's convergence theorem for non-negative martingales; for simplicity, we shall only consider forecasting task G mean . Our aim here is to demonstrate, on a very simple example, how one can use the mathematical machine of the conventional theory of martingales in the game-theoretic framework of this paper. We shall also explain the main ideas used to prove the strong law of large numbers. Lemma 2 Every non-negative farthingale is convergent on a full event.
Proof Let ( 0 it is easy to prove the strong law of large numbers for G mean (item (a) of Theorem 1). We shall brie y describe the main steps of one of many possible proofs (for details see, e.g., Vovk (1996 ), x 5, or Shiryayev (1984 It is obvious that in the above de nition of a null event we can replacè farthingale' by`superfarthingale' and that Lemma 2 can be strengthened to Lemma 3 Every non-negative superfarthingale is convergent on a full event.
(A proof of Lemma 3 can be obtained by a simple modi cation of the proof of Lemma 2; besides, Lemma 3 can be easily deduced from the statement of Lemma 2.)
A predictable stochastic process is a sequence ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; : : :) of random variables such that 0 and 1 are constants and, for i > 1, i (m 1 ; x 1 ; m 2 ; x 2 ; : : :) is determined by (m 1 ; x 1 ; : : :; m i?1 ; x i?1 ; m i ) alone (so the predictable stochastic processes constitute a subclass of the adapted stochastic processes). An adapted stochastic process ( i ) is a semifarthingale if it can be represented as the sum of a superfarthingale and an increasing predictable stochastic process (and any such increasing predictable stochastic process is called a supercompensator of ( i )). It is not di cult to strengthen Lemma 3 to Lemma 4 If ( i ) is a non-negative semifarthingale and ( i ) is its supercompensator, then the event 1 < 1 =) i is convergent is full. Now it is easy to obtain Theorem 1 (a): applying Lemma 5 to the farthingale
and noticing that ( 2 n ) is a semifarthingale with supercompensator n = P n i=1 (2=i) 2 (so that 1 < 1 everywhere), we obtain that it is a full event that n converges; it remains to apply Kronecker's lemma (see, e.g., Stout (1974) , Lemma 3.2.3). QED
It is natural to try to apply the idea of this proof to the`one-sided' item (c) of Theorem 1. However, this idea does not work in the`one-sided' case: say, for the game G mean + , where Statistician is only allowed to buy a non-negative amount of E-tickets, ( 2 n ) is no longer a semifarthingale with supercompensator P n i=1 (2=i) 2 . (Besides, it is not clear if there exists any`onesided' variant of Kronecker's lemma.) A very strong form of Theorem 1 (c) will be proved in Appendix C.
With very minor changes, the method of proof given above also proves the following assertion (analogous to Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers):
in forecasting task G mean&var 0 , whose di erence from G mean&var is that X i and M i are now allowed to be chosen from the whole of IR, it is a full event that Our proof will follow Ville (1939, xV.3) . (In the case of two-valued X i , this result is proved in Minozzo (1996) , x5.6; for an`algorithmic' variant of Ville's proof, see Vovk (1988) .) This proof is very natural, though this fact may be obscured by technical details. In this appendix we rst give a formal proof with little explanation, then we explain the simple ideas behind the proof. It may be helpful to read the formal proof and the informal explanation in parallel. (58)). It would be even su cient to know P n i=1 d i approximately (with a small relative error); therefore, (52) with k de ned by (55) is a natural expression for . The problem is that even k is unknown in advance; the solution is to take the mixture of the`farthingales' corresponding to di erent k with weights w(k) shrinking (as k ! 1) as slowly as possible; we took w(k) = k ?1? (see (53)).
In the above argument the value s 2 ln ln P n i=1 d i P n i=1 d i was obtained from the statement of the law of the iterated logarithm. A less ad hoc way to obtain it is to minimise the sum of the rst two addends in the right-hand side of (57) of a var-ticket can be simulated as the payo of a`portfolio' consisting of 0:98 E-tickets.) Noticing that the above strategy for Statistician requires buying non-negative amounts of E-tickets and var-tickets (see (50) and (51) 
